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Abstract
Mobile service robots are expected to provide services in various domains of life. Herein, the main challenge for the
robot is the execution of complex tasks within an unstructured dynamic environment. In order to achieve the necessary
highly flexible behavior, mobile service robots must have a high degree of autonomy. However, although much effort is
spent on the investigation and realization of autonomy since decades, it is mostly neglected, that autonomous robots are
also causing new types of safety problems. It seems impossible to solve these problems with traditional passive safety
approaches. Therefore, new methods are introduced in order to check safety during operation time.
1 Introduction
Mobile service robots are expected to provide services in
various domains of life. Herein, the main challenge for
the robot is the execution of complex tasks within an un-
structured dynamic environment while collaborating with
human users in a natural and intuitive way. In order to
achieve the necessary highly flexible behavior, mobile ser-
vice robots must have a high degree of autonomy. How-
ever, although much effort is spent on the investigation
and realization of autonomy since decades, it is mostly ne-
glected, that autonomous robots are also causing new types
of safety problems. While a safe stationary robotic ma-
nipulator can be obtained by avoiding any collisions with
users or the environment (e.g. with the help of a separating
safety cage), this is no longer the case for autonomous mo-
bile robots. Here, touching human persons might be even
necessary on the one side, while also the pure decisions of
the robot, e.g. delivering a requested medicine, could also
cause safety-critical situations on the other side.
In this contribution, the main focus is related to the de-
velopment on a more comprehensive realizing a suitable
and adequate level of safety. The contribution is orga-
nized as follows: First, autonomous robots are identified
as safety-critical systems. Here safety is interpreted as a
state of the robot-environment-interaction. Any method to
check safety during operation requires suitable measures.
So called active measures are introduced, whereby safety
is mainly influenced by the safety of the state of operation
and the safety of the behavior of the robot as described in
the following part. In the experimental section, it is de-
scribed how this can be practically realized on a real robot
or within a simulation environment.
2 Background and Related Work
A mobile robot which is intended to move autonomously
in a dynamic environment will be considered. The robot is
interacting with objects and human persons over a longer
period of time in order to solve given tasks. It is often
neglected that a higher degree of autonomy also results in
higher safety requirements, especially if these autonomous
robots have to interact closely with human users.
2.1 Robots are safety-critical systems
Safety-critical systems are those systems whose failure
could result in loss of life, significant property damage or
damage of the environment. Therefore, a system is called
safe if it can be ensured that risks are kept at an acceptable
level (IEC61508). Herein, risk is the possibility of injury,
loss or environment incident created by a hazard, while the
significance or level of the risk is generally determined by
the probability of an unwanted incident and the severity
of the consequences. Mobile robots have a considerable
mass and kinetic energy during operation, they share the
same environment with human users and autonomous mo-
bile robots are in addition even enabled to come to own de-
cisions. Therefore, mobile robots and especially those with
a higher degree of autonomy are clearly safety-critical sys-
tems. Some first contributions that are especially focused
on the development of safe autonomous mobile robots can
already be found in the literature, see e.g. [5], [6], [8].
However, most of these papers are mainly focusing on
single aspects of this special safety-related problem like
software verification, special redundant hardware systems,
special software development processes etc.
2.2 Active Safety Measures
In this contribution, the main focus is related to the de-
velopment on a more comprehensive realizing a suitable
and adequate level of safety. Nevertheless, the develop-
ment of safe autonomous mobile robots should first of all
also include all well known development processes and
measures for safety-critical systems in general. Most of
these measures however are passive, i.e. they are applied
during the development phase in order to achieve a safe
system. This includes safety-related analysis, a suitable
design of the mechanical and electrical/electronic parts,
programming guidelines, verification and validation of the
software, robust control etc. However, it is typical for all
passive safety measures that possible hazards and failures
must be foreseen and included in the safety analysis pro-
cess during development. It is turned out, that safety is
always related to the overall state of the robot and the envi-
ronment, also including human persons, and it is nearly im-
possible to foresee all possible interactions between robot
and environment at design time. Therefore, it seems to be
more promising to add active measures to ensure safety
in the case of autonomous mobile robots, see e.g. [3].
These measures are active during the operation of the mo-
bile robot in order to ensure safety. Herein, the risk of
failure is mainly effected by the knowledge/perception of
the state of the robot, the safe behavior, and finally the cor-
rectness of the application. The last aspect, i.e. correct
application of the robot, means that the robot is applied
in a specific task as originally intended, i.e. not operated
outdoor if originally intended for indoor application. How-
ever, in most cases of practical interest, this can already be
guaranteed by the human user and hence the main focus of
this contribution is on the two remaining aspects.
2.3 System Architecture
It is recognized that efficient robot control architectures are
combining reactive control and deliberation to a hybrid de-
liberative/reactive architecture [3], [6], this architecture is
also adopted here for robot control. In a hybrid delibera-
tive/reactive architecture, complex and long-term planning
tasks based on the world model are solved on a deliberative
layer, the generated plans are executed in a reactive fashion
by the activation of a set of suitable behaviors in the under-
lying reactive layer [3]. These layers are extended in this
work in order to achieve the active safety concept. On the
deliberative layer, the planning and decision making pro-
cedures also take the result of the risk assessment of the
current and future predicted situations into account. The
generated plans therefore must lead to situations whose
risk is always kept below the accepted level. On the re-
active layer, the risk assessment of the situations must also
be considered during the activation of suitable behaviors.
This reactive behavior is solved by the help of a model-
predictive control approach [1]. Hereby, the execution of
the plans is formulated as an optimization problem while
the safety aspects as a result of the risk assessment are
forming constraints. An on-line optimization finally leads
to the optimal action while keeping the safety constraints.
The overall structure of this architecture (see also [7]) is
finally shown in the following Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Overall system architecture for the proposed
safety concept for autonomous mobile robots.
3 Active Measure Describing Safe
Situations
The safe state of operation includes reliable functioning
of the sensors, the computer systems as well as safe func-
tioning of the actuators. Here, several measures to in-
crease safety with regard to this point are applied. How-
ever, it is difficult to identify the safety-critical components
for autonomous mobile robots because the occurring of
hazards often depend strongly on environmental constella-
tions. Many cause-effect-relationships cannot be foreseen.
For example, even a wheel-driven small robot can become
dangerous: It may cause harm to humans if, for instance
the robot is falling down the stairs.
The definition of mechanisms to avert these dangerous sit-
uations seems to be very difficult. A more promising con-
cept at least to increase safety is to formulate and observe
operating conditions for actuating components, such as
servos, arms, propellers or driving motors. The violation
of the conditions initiates movement limitations or restric-
tions, for example the limitation of driving speed, accel-
eration or angle. The conditions are defined with focus
on functionality of the single actuating hardware without
considering any high level capabilities. These conditions
shall exclude these states of operation which cannot be de-
tected by a system itself (system crash) and which are a pri-
ori known as unwanted. This method is generally adopted
from traditional safety assuring techniques: A power sup-
ply of a rotating production machine’s motor is discon-
nected when the chassis is open. The condition ’chassis
open’ is realized by a contact sensor, the limitation of the
actuator is realized by a disconnection of the motors power
supply by relays, for instance. If the movement of actua-
tors are those that transfers potential dangerous energy to
the system, it is worth to have an closer look at them: The
actuators could provoke hazards but they are controlled by
systems in order to produce a defined behavior. If there
are rising hazards, these can be caused by failure of the
superordinate control layer or its superordinate layers.
A simple concept to avoid undefined and therefore po-
tential dangerous states of an actuator, is to await a cer-
tain ’liveliness’ of the direct superordinate control compo-
nent. The superordinate control level again awaits defined
’liveliness’ from its next superordinate component(s). The
surveillance of the ’liveliness’ can be simply realized with
the help of the so-called ’watchdog’-method, for instance.
The superordinate control of a component generates a peri-
odic signal (’heart beat’ signal). A redundant safety com-
ponent observes this signal and limits the corresponding
actuator, respectively. The surveillance of a heart beat does
not allow a detailed failure diagnosis of the superordinate
component but allows at least a conclusion on its maximum
execution performance. A strongly reduced execution per-
formance of the superordinate component leads to signal
irregularities or even to reduced frequency, which requires
a reaction, for example the reduction of the acting speed.
The breakdown of the heart beat requires the disconnection
of the superordinate control component from the actuator
or even taking-over of control by a redundant system. An
example of such an system is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Example of an integrated component safety re-
dundancy.
The controller has to provide an adequate ’heart beat’ sig-
nal to the safety observer. The frequency is adopted to the
kind of motor usage (Motor M) or may also vary in order to
adapt to a changing motor usage. The safety observer can
disconnect the motor directly after or prior to the amplifier.
Additionally, a logic is included to realize an override of
the controller signal. This basically enables the redundant
functionality of the safety observer.
The safety observer can provide additional functionality
when the ’heart beat’ fails. A control redundancy is real-
ized. First of all, additional hard- or software or mostly
has a negative effect on the overall system availability.
However, if undefined states can be recognized and suit-
able countermeasures are activated, the safety with respect
to considered component can be increased. If dangerous
states are avoided, which are awaited to occur with a cer-
tain probability, the saftey is increased. However, the fail-
safe functionality must be realized very carefully, espe-
cially if it cannot be realized by simply switching off the
motors, for instance.
One further advantage of the proposed approach, which
is transferred from other safety-critical applications, is the
realization of functionality with different tool chains (pro-
gramming languages, compilers etc.) for the control sys-
tem and the safety system. This reduces the probability of
systematic compiler errors.
4 Active Measures for a Safe Behav-
ior
The second aspect, as already mentioned, deals with the
safe behavior of the robot, meaning that the robot is ful-
filling its tasks and reaching its goals as planned, while
keeping the risk below an accepted level. However, this
risk does not only depend on the robot itself but clearly
also on the dynamic environment. In this contribution, the
two types of risks - the deliberative or physical risks (see
also [7]) as shown in Figure 1 - are subsumed as behavioral
risks, it is focused the feasibility of the on-line risk assess-
ment in principle. The risk assessment is a basic feature
of the proposed approach and is a dynamic process that
takes the overall state of the robot and the environment,
as well as the interaction between robot and environment
into account. A suitable model of the robot-environment-
interaction, i.e. a suitable world model is required. For that
purpose, an extended version of the cognitive framework
called ’Situation-Operator-Model’ (exSOM) [4], [7] is ap-
plied. Core of this exSOM-approach is the assumption,
that the real world is modeled as a sequence of discrete-
time situations and operators. Situations describe the cur-
rent state of the world comprising the robot and the en-
vironment as perceived by the robot. Each situation is
that extract and internal representation of the real world
which is of current interest for the robot. The situation
is described by a suitable set of so-called characteristics.
The characteristics could be numerical, boolean or linguis-
tic variables, but also more complex data structures. They
include information which is perceived from the external
world, i.e. the environment, with the help of suitable sen-
sors and signal processing, and also information of the cur-
rent physical and cognitive state of the robot, e.g. the cur-
rent active goals and plans.
Changes in the real world are represented by so-called op-
erators. The operators are linking the situations in a way
that the situation snapshot at any point in time is trans-
ferred by an operator to the following situation [4]. These
changes can be caused by the robot itself. With the help of
a knowledge database that consists of situation-operator-
situation sets, a planning process can be realized in order
to change current situation to a desired goal situation. This
intentional acting is also called behavior. A ’safe behav-
ior’ is to ensure that risk are lower than acceptable level.
In the discrete-time description of the exSOM approach,
safety is a property of any situation s(k) at any time step
k, and is described by a risk value which is assigned to
the situation. This risk value clearly depends on the val-
ues of the current set of characteristics {ci(k)} and thus
also depends on both robot and environment. A risk value
of a situation describes the probability of an unwanted in-
cident in the future and the severity of the consequences,
given the current set of characteristics. In this approach,
a risk is only assigned to situations and not directly to op-
erators. Therefore, operators transfer a current situation
with current risk into the next situation with respective cur-
rent risk. The risk information is encoded with risk val-
ues. These combine both, accident severity and probabil-
ity (Risk = SAcc · PAcc). Therefore, accidental events
(PAcc = 1) or hazards (0 ≥ PAcc > 1) can be described.
The severity is assumed to be 0 ≥ SAcc ≥ 1 whereby
SAcc = 1 denotes worst case accident.
Basically, future risks of a mobile robot in a dynamic en-
vironment can hardly be foreseen and modeled completely
beforehand. [9],[2]. Therefore, a framework is developed
to integrate and utilize dynamic risk knowledge in order
to enable a on-line risk assessment. The risk knowledge
can be included manually during a very early development
phase. The basic idea of this risk assessment is to trans-
fer the safety expert knowledge into the system instead of
implementing specific safety assurance mechanisms. The
knowledge can also be transferred in a highly abstracted
manner because the SOM approach and therefore the ex-
SOM approach is able to deal with very high abstractions.
Furthermore, the risk causes are formulated as basic prin-
ciples which shall be valid for all future situations. For
example, heated plastic materials generate toxic vapors or
start to burn. So, the principle that the combination of in-
tense heat and plastic materials is dangerous is not true in
all cases, but not wrong in ’conservative’ safety concept. If
an exception is known it could be added to the knowledge,
in all other cases the system would avoid to approach ’plas-
tic’ to ’heat sources’ generally. Therefore, the principles
are valid premises which can be used with (valid) obser-
vations for deductive conclusion. If the principle ’plastic
object close to a heat source is hazardous’ exists and there
would be the observation ’plastic object is close to heat
source’, the conclusion ’hazard occurs’ would be correct.
This first part of a safety principle represents a conditional
part. The goal of this conditional part is to recognize the
occurring of a hazard in principle, for example by detect-
ing a heat source and a plastic object in the same situation
(temporal relation is given by the exSOM approach). The
related computational part contains the instructions for the
determination of the respective risk. Therefore the com-
putational part describes which information is needed and
how this information is processed to generate a quantitative
risk value. In many cases, the geometrical relations be-
tween involved objects are important, for instance the rela-
tive speed and the distance are important when computing
risks of kinetic energies or collision risks, the temperature
is essential when computing inflammation risks. Initially,
the computation parts of each safety principle have to be
constructed. However, it is often difficult to formulate the
dependencies of risks in a specific context. First of all, a
transfer from a understandable qualitative to quantitative
description can be realized with the help of fuzzy methods
(see [7]). Furthermore, it is suggested to interpolate be-
tween known data, for instance it is assumed that a plastic
object with no distance to a hot stove is melting and there-
fore producing toxic vapors. Further on, it is assumed that
the same plastic object is safe in a distance of 50cm. This
information can be interpolated. The resulting risk func-
tion is a linear function depending on the distance of the to
objects heat source and plastic object.
One remaining question considers the completeness of the
safety-related knowledge with respect to these two parts of
the risk assessment system. It is assumed that a first defini-
tion of the principles is based upon the expert knowledge
of the engineers during the design phase. Since this knowl-
edge usually will be incomplete and not cover all possi-
ble situations with a considerable risk, learning will be ap-
plied in the future realization. Here, reinforcement learn-
ing could be a suitable approach, where a human supervi-
sor enters his own risk assessment results with the help of
a suitable man-machine-interface during robot actions in
simulations or experimental runs.
5 Realization Examples
5.1 Observing Safe Situation
The state of operation shall be surveyed by a very simple
concept to avoid undefined and therefore potential danger-
ous states of an actuator. A certain ’liveliness’ of the direct
superordinate control components is awaited. Therefore a
periodic ’on-off’ signal, a so-called ’heart beat’ signal is
generated by the superordinate component and examined
by a safety observer. To give an example, the differen-
tial drive of a ’Pioneer 3D’ robot platform is regarded as a
safety-critical component.
That illustrated concept comprises a simple microcon-
troller board (called ’safety board’) that has its own power
supply consisting of batteries. The safety board is con-
nected to the main computer system and is able to discon-
nect the power supply of the electrical drives for motion
generation, by a suitable electronic circuit. The main robot
control software is extended in a way that a signal is gener-
ated in a regular fashion (’heart beat’) which is connected
with the interrupt input of the microcontroller. The signal
generation extension itself again includes further observ-
ing mechanisms to observe further ’liveliness’ conditions
of the next superordinate level. In this example the re-
sponse time of the collision avoidance is checked. If the
response time is dropping, the frequency of the ’heart beat’
signal is lowered, too. Furthermore, the frequency can also
be reduced when the driving motors are not used in order
to save processing power. If the main computer fails or has
a deadlock, the heart beat signal will be no longer gener-
ated.
The safety board reacts to changes of the ’heart beat sig-
nal’. The reactions are shown in Table 1.
In case of a missing ’heart beat’ signal the safety board
is disconnecting the drives like an emergency stop. If the
’liveliness’ condition is fulfilled again, the regular opera-
tion can take place again (unblocking of analog circuit after
< 1s, software after 10s). In case of exceeding the max-
imum frequency a ’repair mode’ is activated. Such high
frequency is caused by contact problems which then have
to be repaired. After repairing the system, the circuit could
be reset to normal operation.
The realization of safety-critical systems with pro-
grammable devices includes the risk that also software
faults could occur. Therefore, a additional analog circuit
is implemented. The analog circuit consists of a low pass
filter and two voltage comparators. The mean value of the
heart beat signal is expected to remain between an upper
and a lower voltage threshold. While this threshold condi-
tion is fulfilled, the motor’s power lines are kept connected
(via relays). So, both analogue and digital circuit have to
’unblock’ in order to activate the ’normally open contact’
relays.
In addition, the safety board also includes some sensors
like acceleration sensors to detect irregular and fast motion
of the robot or attitude sensors to detect if the robot tends
to fall. In all these cases, the safety board is switching of
the drives, too.
Table 1: Reactions of the safety board under consideration
of the ’heart beat’ signal.
5.2 Observing Safe Behavior
The safe behavior of the robot means that the robot is ful-
filling its tasks and reaching its goals as planned, while
keeping the risk below an accepted level. However, this
risk does strongly depend on the dynamic environment.
Therefore, risk assessment is a basic feature of the pro-
posed approach and must be a dynamic process that takes
the environment as well as the interaction between robot
and environment into account. In a small demonstration a
possible solution for a risk assessment is focused to enable
evaluation of the interaction between a robot and its envi-
ronment. This demonstration takes place in a small virtual
grid world. This grid world is seen as a internal represen-
tation of a simplified real world. It is assumed that ob-
ject recognition techniques and technical cognitive system
(exSOM) are able to generate such internal representation
dynamically. Furthermore, uncertainties in modeling and
object recognition are not considered. The mentioned grid
world can be seen as world model or world map of the cur-
rent environmental world. When the interaction between a
robot and its environment is considered, the investigation
of temporal and spatial relations of objects is important in
order to observe the interplay of the objects handled by
the robot and of other surrounding objects. Therefore the
grid world contains scene objects which are placed at cor-
responding map position. These objects are represented by
a single character at respective position in the grid world.
The robot is represented by a rectangular shape and can
be moved in horizontal and vertical direction. The robot
can grip and transport one object. The gripped object is
represented by a character inside the robot’s shape. The
scene objects are known objects which means that they can
be recognized by the object recognition and further object
information can be retrieved from an object information
database. Such additional information can be attributes of
objects, e.g. ’plastic’, ’liquid container’. This additional
information is assumed to be integrated manually prior to
operating time. It is expected that such information could
also be obtained by learning mechanisms.
The robot can change the spatial relation of the scene ob-
jects by gripping and transporting of scene objects. The
change of the spatial relation can provoke risks. These
risks are an essential aspect when safe behavior should be
assured. For example, the robot comes to close to a fire-
place and starts burning, the robot provokes fire by putting
a plastic object on a hot stove in accordance to its task
’bring dishes to kitchen’ or the robot is instructed to fetch
the blind user’s medicine and delivers the wrong one. For a
first step, it is important to exclude such situations. There-
fore, a set of safety principles is implemented. The princi-
ples are formulated in a way such that they are abstracted
from specific hazard cause in order to generate general-
ized principles. This abstraction is achieved by formulat-
ing principles with respect to objects or their attributes, for
instance, the spatial combination of ’plastic’ objects and
’extreme heat’ is dangerous. If this conditional part of a
safety principle is fulfilled, the respective computational
part determines the risk value. Therefore a risk function
is specified. This risk function can be any function that is
suitable to map the situation to a risk value. In the example
step functions, linear functions or combinations of linear
functions are used. Function arguments can also be in-
formation about the internal state such as the speed of the
robot or the distance of the objects or any exSOM char-
acteristic. It is suggested to interpolate known risk values
(most often these are the extremes) in order to specify these
functions, for example with linear, polynomial functions or
even with neural networks. In the following, three exam-
ples are explained in more detail in order to illustrate this
approach. The numerical risk values are exemplary.
The used scene object are abbreviated by capital characters
and furnished with attribute as described in Table 2.
5.2.1 Decoding of the Grid World Distance
The grid world that is used to simulate the dynamics of ob-
ject interplay is kept as simple as possible. The limitation
to geometrical measures between objects is insufficient.
Therefore, some of the geometrical distance ranges repre-
sent other properties. The relative distance of two objects
with dist = 1 is defined as ’these objects are combined
with each other’. A symbolic task procedure description
can be used for risk assessment, for example ’give’ ’Object
A’ to ’Object B’ or ’put’ ’Object A’ into/on top of ’Object
B’ etc.
The remaining distance ranges are geometrical measures
and represent 1 > dist ≥ 2 ’to be in contact to’, 2 >
dist ≥ 3 ’to be very close to’, 3 > dist ≥ 4 ’to be close
to’, 4 > dist ≥ 5 ’to be in the range of ’.
Table 2: The used scene objects, their abbreviation and
their assigned attributes.
5.2.2 Modeling danger of chemical intoxication
An chemical intoxication can take place if a chemical prod-
uct is given to a human. This can happen when there is a
error with respect to correct recognition of the chemical it-
self or the dosage. Hazards can occur, if the robot has to
deliver chemicals to a human user, e.g. if the robot is in-
structed by a human user to dissolve a medicine in a glass
of water. In doing so the mishap may happen that more
than the desired number of pills is dropped in the glass
of water. Further on, a blind user instructs the robot to
fetch essential medicine and the robot delivers the wrong
medicine because the object recognition was disturbed. In
order to increase safety of service robots in such context
these tasks have to be specified more precisely or they are
seen as being too risky in general, as described in the fol-
lowing example.
In the grid world the handing over of one object to another
is assumed when the distance between these two objects is
dist = 1 grid field.
Table 3: Relation of of objects with the attribute chemical
when applied to humans formulated with the help of a step
function.
If the robot is intends to ’give’ an object
with the attribute ’chemical’ in to the object
’human’ (distA:chemical,human = 1), a risk
riskA:chemical,human = 1 results in accordance the safety
principle realized with a step function as shown in Table
3.
This rule is applied to a grid world example. If the robot
carries a chemical object, for example a ’medicine M’
(definition in accordance to Table 2) and would give it to
the object ’human H’ (distance of 1 grid world field) this
will result the risk value of ’1’, what is show in Figure 3
with the help of a colored risk values (color gradient from
red for risk = 1 over orange, yellow, gray to white for
risk = 0 are used).
H M
Figure 3: Risk value depicted as color code for respective
robot action. Distance of ’1’ is defined as ’give’ ’medicine’
to ’human’.
5.2.3 Modeling danger of burning/melting plastic
In a further scenario it is assumed, that a robot is instructed
to bring the dishes to the kitchen sink. In order to perform
this task the robot grips the plastic bowl and puts it on the
stove under assumption that this is an optimal surface for
depositing the dishes. The stove is still hot and the plastic
bowl would start melting or even burning. The approach-
ing of objects with the attribute ’plastic’ (’A : plastic’) to
objects with the attribute ’heat’ (’A : heat’) is dangerous
in principle, when the robot is not equipped with a temper-
ature sensor in order to retrieve additional information. A
simplified safety principle could be modeled as described
in Table 4.
Table 4: Relation of of objects with the attribute plastic
when approached to heat sources with the help of a linear
function.
The risk computation part is realized with a linear func-
tion. It is assumed that the direct contact is very risky
(distA:plastic,A:heat = 1 → riskA:plastic,A:heat = 1).
If the distance between plastic object and heat source is
big enough, there is no risk anymore (disA:plastic,A:heat =
3 → riskA:plastic,A:heat = 0). The interpolation between
these two values is realized by applying the straight-line
equation (linear function). Instead of linear functions also
polynomials or neural networks can be used. For respec-
tive interpolation additional parameters could be neces-
sary. When the robot carries a ’coffee cup C’, which is
specified as a plastic object (in accordance to Table 2), the
approaching the ’kitchen stove S’ will result a certain risk
in dependence to the distance of these two objects as shown
in Figure 4.
S C
Figure 4: The approaching of ’plastic’ and ’heat’ in-
creases risk. Putting the plastic object on top of the heat
source (dist = 1) is very dangerous.
5.2.4 Modeling danger of scalding
When a robot carries a cup with hot tea, a collision with
a human is more dangerous because there is the additional
risk of scalding. It is assumed that the risk of collision de-
pends on the relative distance and to the speed of the robot.
The risk of scalding is considered insofar, that the collision
risk while carrying ’hot liquids’ is higher than the simple
collision risk. Therefore a safety principle is defined by
combining four risk functions.
Table 5: Combined risk function to model the increased
scalding danger by fast movement while transporting ’hot
liquid’. Giving (dist = 1) ’hot liquid’ (cup of coffee) to a
human is modeled as not dangerous.
The first risk function is a mask function in order to define
the geometric distance considering risks. The second func-
tion is a linear interpolation in dependence of the relative
distance. The third risk function, which is an interpolation
in dependence of the speed, is multiplied with the first and
second risk function. Hence, a 2D risk map is generated
with respect to geometrical dependencies. The logical risk
of ’giving’ the object to human is realized with fourth func-
tion, which is added as inverted mask function as shown in
Table 5.
When the robot is carrying a coffee cup which basically
can contain hot liquid (in accordance to Table 2), the risk
is assumed to depend on the speed of the robot and the rel-
ative distance to humans. When the robot is driving with
full speed while carrying a coffee cup containing hot liq-
uid, the risk of scalding rises when the robot is approach-
ing a human (see Figure 5 upper part). When the speed is
lowered to half speed, the risk is lowered in principle (see
Figure 5 lower part). From that follows, the approaching
to a human while transporting hot liquids can only be al-
lowed when the speed is reduced adequately. The intention
of handing over of the cup of coffee to a human is defined
as not dangerous.
H C
H C
Figure 5: Risk value depicted as color code for respec-
tive robot position. Risk in relation of distance and speed
(without consideration of moving direction), when ap-
proaching to a human, while robot is carrying a cup of
coffee. Resulting risks are shown, while robot is driving
half speed (top) and full speed (bottom). The intention to
give the cup of coffee to a human is modeled as not dan-
gerous (dist = 1).
6 Conclusion and Outlook
Flexible and intelligent behavior however can only be
achieved by mobile service robots with a high degree of
autonomy. Thus, a strict and static safety strategy would
exclude the application of service robots quite fundamen-
tally. This contribution is addressing such autonomy de-
pendent problems. The safe state of operation and the safe
behavior are identified as fundamental aspects with regard
to safety of service robots. The capability to change be-
havior as well as internal functional structures during the
operating time implies the need to observe the robot itself
continuously with the help of suitable active measures. In
this contribution is shown how safety components can be
integrated in a hybrid robot architecture and how their ac-
tive measures are generated and used within that structure.
The first safety component is designed to take into account
the safe state of operation of an actuator. In this connec-
tion, a low level safety component is introduced in order to
exclude potential dangerous operation modes. In addition,
a component is outlined which enables to survey the behav-
ior at a planning stage. Hence, a risk assessment method
is introduced in order to reflect risks that arise when acting
in dynamic environments.
Initially, the applied safety principles are kept very sim-
ple, in order to show primarily the functionality of the
presented method. Surely, there will be various problems
when extending this method to further real world prob-
lems. This will be addressed in future research work.
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